Domain-Embeddings Based DGA Detection with Incremental Training Method by Fang, Xin et al.
Domain-Embeddings Based DGA Detection with
Incremental Training Method
1st Xin Fang, 2nd Xiaoqing Sun,3rd Jiahai Yang
Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
Beijing National Research Center for Information
Science and Technology
{fx18, sxq16}@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn, yang@cernet.edu.cn
4th Xinran Liu
National Computer Network Emergency Response Technical
Team/Coordination Center, Beijing, China
lxr@cert.org.cn
Abstract—DGA-based botnet, which uses Domain Generation
Algorithms (DGAs) to evade supervision, has become a part of
the most destructive threats to network security. Over the past
decades, a wealth of defense mechanisms focusing on domain
features have emerged to address the problem. Nonetheless, DGA
detection remains a daunting and challenging task due to the
big data nature of Internet traffic and the potential fact that
the linguistic features extracted only from the domain names are
insufficient and the enemies could easily forge them to disturb
detection. In this paper, we propose a novel DGA detection
system which employs an incremental word-embeddings method
to capture the interactions between end hosts and domains,
characterize time-series patterns of DNS queries for each IP
address and therefore explore temporal similarities between
domains. We carefully modify the Word2Vec algorithm and
leverage it to automatically learn dynamic and discriminative
feature representations for over 1.9 million domains, and develop
an simple classifier for distinguishing malicious domains from the
benign. Given the ability to identify temporal patterns of domains
and update models incrementally, the proposed scheme makes the
progress towards adapting to the changing and evolving strategies
of DGA domains. Our system is evaluated and compared with
the state-of-art system FANCI and two deep-learning methods
CNN and LSTM, with data from a large university’s network
named TUNET. The results suggest that our system outperforms
the strong competitors by a large margin on multiple metrics and
meanwhile achieves a remarkable speed-up on model updating.
Index Terms—Domain-Embeddings, DGA Detection,
Word2vec, Incremental Training
I. Introduction
DGAs are commonly used by botnets to bypass security
mechanisms where some static methods like blacklists are
employed. They can generate a vast amount of pseudo-random
domain names, while the attacker would only select a small
subset for registration to establish command and control
(C&C) connections [1] [2].This results in an asymmetric sit-
uation where attackers can use any one of generated domains
to control bots, but defenders must monitor all of them. A
wide spectrum of methods for DGA detection have been
proposed in recent years, but most of them rely upon the
linguistic features developed and could not work well when
the botmaster decides to change domain-generating strategy.
This explains why some character-based detectors which work
well for traditional DGAs perform poorly when confronted
with those plausibly clean-looking domain names based on
wordlists (also called dictionaries) [3].
In such scenario, we are concerned with developing an
algorithm that is resilient to feature change and able to function
well for not only character-based or wordlist-based DGAs , but
also for any kind of completely new algorithms that are never
seen before. We hold the intuition that bots tend to exhibit sim-
ilar behavior patterns no matter what kind of DGA algorithms
are implemented. These time-relevant patterns provide more
robust and stable features which improve the flexibility against
the changing and evolving attacking strategies. For example,
the bots controlled by the same entity communicate with the
same C&C server, and the botnet members cause a large
amount of regular traffic when launching an attack. In addition,
our system must be adaptive to the big data nature of Internet
traffic and the explosive growth of malicious domains, so an
well-designed incremental training strategy is indispensable to
reduce the model iteration cost.
In this paper, we propose a novel DGA detection system
aiming for a wide range of DGA families and the never-ending
growth of the Internet DNS traffic. The critical nature of our
ideas is to characterize time-series patterns of DNS queries
for each IP address, explore temporal similarities between
domains and apply incremental training strategy to speed up
model updating.
To sum up, the contributions of this work is threefold:
1) In order to improve the flexibility against the changing
and evolving attacking strategies, we focus on the underlying
relevance among the domains and utilize the latent patterns
of DNS query sequences to detect DGAs. We also apply
word2vec algorithm for a mapping from DGA detection to
vector arithmetic.
2) To cope with the never-ending growth of the Internet
DNS traffic, we utilize an incremental training strategy for
word2vec al- gorithm, which helps to speed up the model
training process when additional training data is provided.
3) We built a practical system based on the proposed
algorithm, and achieved excellent results in several empirical
experiments and real-world deployments.978-1-7281-8086-1/20/$31.00 ©2020 IEEE
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we introduce some background knowledge and systematically
outline related works. In Section 3, we propose our DGA
detection system based on the incremental word2vec algorithm
with details. Then we provide our experimental methodology
and results in Section 4. Finally, we summarize our primary
jobs and discuss future work in Section 5.
II. Related Work
A. DGA and DGA Detection
In order to detect DGA domains, Yadav et al. [4] proposed
a technique based on the significant difference between tradi-
tional DGA domains and human generated domains in terms
of the distribution of alphanumeric characters. In addition,
Antonakakis et al. [1], Schu¨ppen et al. [5] and Wang et al.
[6] proposed machine-learning based DGA detectors using
human-engineered lexical features of DGA domain names,
while Tong et al. [7], Lison et al. [8] and Tran et al. [9] came
up with some methods using deep learning algorithms such as
CNN, LSTM, and BiLSTM. However, attackers have designed
a more resilient class of mAGDs produced by randomly
selecting and concatenating words from a dictionary in order
to imitate legitimate domain names created by a human. This
new kind of DGA is much harder to detect. In fact, many state-
of-the-art DGA detectors which function well for traditional
DGAs, perform poorly when faced with wordlist-based ones.
Confronted with such a challenging situation, defenders
have presented several countermeasures. Pereira et al. [3]
firstly proposed a method for combating wordlist-based DGAs
in 2018. They built a new structure named WordGraph based
on the segmentation of domain names, and then employ it to
further discover DGA dictionaries. Another existing approach
raised by J.Koh et al. [10] extracted in-depth semantic features
from unrelated corpus, and used transfer learning theory
to learn the semantic signatures of the wordlist-based DGA
families. These approaches perform well, but only focus on
wordlist-based DGAs nevertheless.
B. Word Embeddings Algorithm
The basic idea of word embeddings was initially proposed
by Hinton in 1986 [11], which was called distributed rep-
resentation at that time. This method is mainly used in the
area of Natural Language Processing (NLP), while we can
still utilize it in Domain Name System (DNS) analyzing field
by analogizing DNS query sequences to natural language
sentences, which follows the core idea of W. Lopez et al. [12]
that considers DNS queries from a particular source IP address
during a specific time interval as words in a single document.
Nowadays the most ubiquitous word embeddings method is
Word2Vec [13], and in this paper we use Skip-Gram model
with Negative Sampling (SGNS) [14], an advanced variant
of Word2Vec, as basic algorithm for its popularity. Several
previous works tried to apply word2vec algorithm to DNS-
related field ( [15], [16]), but their target is traffic classification
instead of DGA detection.
Fig. 1. System architecture.
Although we illustrate that SGNS can accurately classify
mAGDs through experiments, it turns out that existing neural
word embeddings methods, including SGNS, are multi-pass
algorithms and thus cannot perform incremental model update,
which means that they have to re-train the model on the old
and new training data from scratch when additional training
data is provided [17]. To this end, some researchers have
focused on exploring incremental training strategies of word
embeddings methods ( [17], [18]). Similar to the conventional
word2vec algorithm, there was also little or no attention paid
to the incremental word2vec method in the literature when it
comes to DGA detection as far as we know.
III. System Architecture
In this section, we describe our DGA detection system
architecture and training mechanism. As is shown in Fig. 1,
our system has several components: Pre-processor, Detector,
and Post-processor.
A. Pre-processor
Before the preprocessing phase, we deploy our data collec-
tors in several core DNS servers in TUNET to collect raw DNS
logs. Thereafter, we apply black/white lists from both public
sources (e.g., malwaredomainlist.com) and private sources to
raw DNS corpus, which can be considered as a pre-labeling
process. To further calibrate the labeling results, we sample
part of raw data for manual labeling. As for the unlabeled
leftovers, they will be used for training word embeddings since
word2vec algorithm is unsupervised.
After labeling process, we feed all of the data to a data
wrangling and cleaning module, which functions as follows:
First of all, the module traverses through the entire dataset
and remove all queries containing invalid IP addresses, query
type or query name. Second, since many of the DNS queries
are nonexistent domain names, rarely duplicated, and in many
cases composed of a large number of changing prefixes and
a few unchanging suffixes, we decide to merge the similar
domains by common suffixes. Besides, to eliminate the impact
of ccTLD (country code Top-Level Domain [19]), we remove
all ccTLDs from the tail of domain names containing them.
Last but not least, we select the appropriate time window
size and reorganize the data structure. More specifically, we
determine a window size such as 10 minutes, which remains as
a hyper-parameter to be decided later and partition the dataset
accordingly. Query records in each window are organized in
the format of [timestamp, IP, domain1, domain2, · · · ]. Finally,
all queries from a specific IP address during the pre-defined
time window are grouped and hence constitute a Document
with each domain name is a Word.
B. Detector
Our detector consists of two parts: the incremental word2vec
model and the subsequent simple classifier.
1) Incremental Word2Vec Model: Based on previous re-
search results ( [17], [18]), we apply the incremental training
method of SGNS to the domain-embeddings generation model
in this paper. Given one document output from Pre-processor,
we assume that the words (domains) inside constitute a se-
quence: w1, w2, w3, · · · , wn. Then the classical SGNS model
attempts to minimize the following objective function to learn
domain embeddings:
LS GNS = −1n
n∑
i=1
∑
| j|<c, j,0
logσ(twi · cwi+ j ) + kEv∼q(v)[logσ(−twi · cv] (1)
where twi is the target word wi’s embedding and cwi+ j is the
context word wi+ j’s embedding within a window of size c,
σ(x) is the sigmoid function, k is a pre-fixed integer, v is the
negative sample drawn from q(v), and q(v), which is referred
to as negative sampling distribution [18]. While Equation(1)
can be optimized by Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) using
AdaGrad [20] in an online fashion, traditional multi-pass
SGNS training still needs to scan through the entire dataset at
first to pre-compute the negative sampling distribution q(v) ,
which makes it difficult to perform efficient incremental model
update when additional training data is provided every single
time, especially when the amount of the new data is smaller
compared to the old one.
For the reason that new domains keep showing up con-
tinuously in real world, we need to present an incremental
extension of SGNS. We adopt the methodology inherited from
previous works ( [17], [18]), which goes through the train-
ing data solely in a single-pass to update word embeddings
incrementally. Algorithm 1 presents this incremental SGNS
algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Incremental SGNS
1: for each new batch D of training data do
2: f (d)← 0 for all d ∈ D
3: n← length(D)
4: for i← 1, · · · , n do
5: f (di)← f (di) + 1
6: q(d)← f (d)α
Σd′∈D f (d′)α
for all d ∈ D
7: for j← −c, · · · ,−1, 1, · · · , c do
8: draw k negative samples from q(d)
9: use adaptive SGD to update twi , cwi+ j , and
cv1 , · · · , cvk
10: end for
11: end for
12: end for
Algorithm 2 Draw Negative Samples
1: set array r with length K to empty
2: n← length(W)
3: cnt ← 0
4: for i← 1, · · · , n do
5: cnt ← cnt + 1
6: if i ≤ K then
7: ri ← wi
8: else
9: draw an interger k uniformly from 1, 2, · · · , n
10: if k ≤ K then
11: rk ← wi
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
In the implementation of incremental SGNS, how to effi-
ciently produce negative samples is an important issue, since
the efficiency of sampling greatly affects the overall training
speed. To seek solution to this problem, here we utilize the
Reservoir Sampling [21] algorithm, which helps to generate
one single negative sample in only O(1) time (See Algorithm
2).
2) Logistic Regression Classifier: Without loss of gener-
ality, we use the Logistic Regression classifier as the tail
classifier. It receives all the word-embeddings popped out from
word2vec model and the corresponding ground-truth label,
which specifies whether the domain is malicious or not. It
is noteworthy that logistic regression already has the potential
for incremental training because it can update the parameters
using SGD every time there is new training data provided. In
the testing/evaluation/deploy phase, the classifier can directly
calculate the input domain-embeddings’ labels without extra
operations.
3) Workflow Description: Before Detector, we already di-
vide datasets into labeled part (relatively small) and unlabelled
part (relatively big) due to expensive manual labeling cost.
Fortunately, we do not need ground truth when training
unsupervised word2vec models. Hence, our overall training
strategy is to use all received valid data for training word2vec
model, while feed only labeled ones to the classifier to make
the best use of collected data. Actually, based on such a greedy
strategy, we have guaranteed the quality and generalization
ability of the obtained domain-embeddings, which plays a vital
role in improving the performance of the Logistic Regression
classifier trained with relatively small amounts of labeled data.
C. Post-processor
The classification results from Detector can be used in
two ways. First, we can assume that a domain name whose
score is above a pre-set threshold is a DGA-generated domain
name with a high probability. Thus, with this assumption, we
can construct a feedback loop to update the blacklists and
whitelists in the pre-processing session. Second, we can make
use of the results of test dataset to conduct performance eval-
uation of the detector and make analysis on hard-cases, which
is extremely meaningful for estimating the trends of current
and in-coming DGAs and further improving the performance
of DGA detection system.
IV. Datasets
We collected DNS data for two consecutive weeks from the
Tsinghua campus network using Passive DNS [22] tools. A
total of 162 million raw DNS query logs were obtained. The
lengthy periods of data recording guarantee a representative
dataset which contains different times of the day, different days
of the week, and different working/non-working days. More
information about the datasets is shown in Table 1.
There are some steps to be done before experiments.
The critical points of our ideas are first filtering data with
black/white lists and then manual labeling. Due to the huge
amount of the collected raw data, we cannot afford to label
them all. Thus we sample and label the first 15% of the total
162 million queries and split this labeled dataset into two parts:
80% as trainset-with-gt (i.e. training set with ground truth) and
the left 20% as testset-with- gt (i.e. test set with ground truth),
which are employed to conduct the comparison experiments
between our method and existing methods.
The reason why we choose the first 15% of datasets for
labeling is that during the time of collecting this part of
data, we coincidentally found there are a large number of
domains collected from query logs appearing on the malicious
domain lists of some public blacklists such as DGArchive [23].
Therefore, we started to collect data from that point of time
and took these DNS logs containing DGA domains as the
ground truth datasets to be labeled.
Meanwhile, the last 85% unlabelled logs are used as the
validation data for incremental word2vec algorithm because
we intend to demonstrate that incremental word2vec could
function well not only for the initial labeled datasets but also
for newly added data. We randomly sample them at a scale of
1/10 in a consecutive way, then filter and manually label this
new dataset. Again, the first 80% and last 20% of the dataset
are put into trainset-with-gt and testset- with-gt respectively.
TABLE I
Details of TUNET DNS Datasets
Properties Descriptions
Duration of Data Collection A total of consecutive 14 days
Generation Rate of DNS Queries About 500 thousand / h
Peak Rate of DNS Queries About 3 million / h
Occupied Space About 7GB / day
Total Amount of DNS queries About 162 million in total
Amount of Unique Domains Queried About 1.9 million in total
TABLE II
Analysis Results of Datasets with Ground-Truth
Properties Values
All DNS Total Amount 38,235,023
Domains Unique Amount 463,030
Benign DNS Total Amount 35,833,755
Domains Unique Amount 368,793
Total Amount 2,401,268
DGA DNS Unique Amount 94,237
Domains Character-Based 84,538 (Unique)
Wordlist-based 9,699 (Unique)
V. Experiments
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed
scheme over the real-world network. All operations were
performed on a terminal server with Intel i7 8700K@3.70GHz
CPU and 32GB RAM running Ubuntu Linux 16.04.
A. Visualization
In order to be intuitive, we use t-SNE [24] to visualize the
domain-embeddings generated from the incremental word2vec
model. As is shown in Fig.2, DGA domains belonging to
different families are labeled as class 1 to 11 and drawn in
different colors, while benign domains are labeled as class
0 and densely clustered in the right of the picture. Among
the classes, class 6 drawn in cyan refers to wordlist-based
DGA domains, and the other classes except class 0 represent
character-based DGA domains.
Fig.2 demonstrates that the clusters of malicious and benign
domains can be divided neatly without difficulty with the
help of incremental word2vec. It is suggested that those
wordlist-based DGA domain names, which always mislead tra-
ditional methods, could be easily identified using incremental
word2vec algorithm.
B. Comparison Experiment
To further evaluate our system performance, we conduct
comparison experiments between IWM (short for Incremental
Word2Vec Model), FANCI (representative of traditional ma-
chine learning methods), CNN and LSTM (representative of
character-based deep learning methods).
It is notable that current popular DGA detection methods
such as FANCI [5] and D3N [7] usually conduct experiments
Fig. 2. Visualization of Domain-Embeddings with all DGA Families Using
t-SNE
TABLE III
Results of Exp.1 to Exp.5 with All DGA Families
Methods Trainset Testset PRE TPR FPR F1-score
FANCI NXD NXD 0.791 0.932 0.117 0.856
FANCI NXD all 0.001 0.176 0.603 0.001
FANCI all all 0.967 0.717 0.012 0.823
CNN all all 0.962 0.906 0.0004 0.934
LSTM all all 0.949 0.962 0.0003 0.947
IWM all all 0.989 0.980 0.0001 0.983
solely on NXDomains, which would miss many DGA do-
mains. In fact, the number of DGA domains in NXDomains
only accounts for less than 36% of the total in all DNS
data. Moreover, we find that FANCI method using Random
Forests trained on NXDomains does not perform well on our
testset containing only NXDomains, especially for wordlist-
based malicious domains, which are almost undetectable in
this case. Furthermore, if we evaluate the model with our
testsets containing domains beyond the NXDomains, barely
can it function normally.
Considering the situation above, we design the following
sub-experiments. The results are published in Table 3 and
Table 4.
Exp.1. RF (short for Random Forests) of FANCI, trained
on NXDomains extracted from trainset-with-gt, evaluated on
NXDomains extracted from testset-with-gt.
Exp.2. RF of FANCI, trained on NXDomains extracted
from trainset-with-gt, evaluated on testset-with-gt.
TABLE IV
Results of Exp.1 to Exp.5 with only Wordlist-Based DGA
Methods Trainset Testset PRE TPR FPR F1-score
FANCI NXD NXD 0.014 0.177 0.118 0.026
FANCI NXD all 0.001 0.002 0.987 0.001
FANCI all all 0.096 0.133 0.012 0.112
CNN all all 0.239 0.475 0.014 0.318
LSTM all all 0.345 0.489 0.010 0.403
IWM all all 0.996 1.000 0.000 0.995
Exp.3. RF of FANCI, trained on trainset-with-gt, evaluated
on testset-with-gt.
Exp.4. CNN and LSTM, trained on trainset-with-gt, evalu-
ated on testset-with-gt.
Exp.5. IWM, trained on trainset-with-gt, evaluated on
testset-with-gt.
To be clear, we describe the training strategy for IWM
here: As for labeled datasets, we extract the first half of the
trainset-with-gt as the initial train set and the last half as
the new data continuously collected in the real world, named
incremental-trainset. And for unlabelled datasets used to train
word embeddings, the same operations are conducted. For the
sake of convenience, we divide the incremental train set (both
labeled and unlabelled) into ten pieces. During the experiment,
we first train the initial model on the initial train set and
then conduct model updating operations for each newly added
dataset.
The performance of models are evaluated with metrics as
follows: Precision, True positive rate (also called Recall),
False positive rate and F1-score.
Through Exp.1,2 and 5, we can conclude that the perfor-
mance of FANCI can hardly meet peoples expectations. And
in order to validate that our method is superior to traditional
machine learning and deep learning algorithms based solely
on domain name strings with the same train set and test set,
we conducted experiments 3, 4, and 5. We can see that IWM,
whether tested with all DGA families or only wordlist-based
DGA family, performs apparently better than FANCI, CNN,
and LSTM.
What is more, it can be inferred that when confronted
with wordlist- based DGA domain names, IWM trumps other
detectors with the result of 100% recall and 99.6% precision,
while the best of the others can hardly achieve half of the
values.
Fig. 3. Training Time of Basic and Incremental Word2Vec Method When
New Data is Provided)
TABLE V
Comparison Results of Basic and Incremental Word2Vec Algorithm
Methods PRE TPR FPR F1-score Training Time
Basic 0.938 0.974 0.0003 0.943 214,213s
Incre 0.949 0.962 0.0003 0.947 81,032s
C. Evaluation of Incremental Methodology
This evaluation experiment is used to show that our polished
version of the basic word2vec algorithm, i.e., incremental
word2vec, could perform as well as or even better than its
predecessor while gaining a tremendous acceleration in model
updating. We construct two control groups: one is standard
word2vec method, and the other is incremental word2vec
method. The way training data is processed is the same as
Exp.5 in section B, and both groups use testset-with-gt as
evaluation dataset. The training epoch number for both groups
is 200 and the evaluation results are listed in Table 5 and Fig.
3.
VI. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented a novel system using incre-
mental word2vec algorithm, which leverages inter-domain
relationships to detect DGA domains effectively with scalable
capability. Our system performs ex- cellently when confronted
with various DGA families, even with wordlist-based DGAs,
which are almost invincible for traditional detectors.
Moreover, to make model updating faster when new data
is continuously provided, we explore an incremental training
strategy. In our empirical experiments, we demonstrate that our
incremental word2vec method could not only outperform other
detectors but also gain a tremendous acceleration in model re-
training.
Since the datasets for training and evaluation are collected
continuously from the real-world networks, it is evident that
our system is an online system which deals with tens of
thousands of DNS query streams with high accuracy and
efficiency.
The limitation of this paper is that the vocabulary of
incremental word2vec model could become very large when
unlimited data pours in, even though we already take measures
such as merging common suffixes of domains to shorten the
length of the vocabulary. It is difficult because we cannot
merely limit the max length of the vocabulary due to the
possible absence of some domains embedding that may lead
the classifier to fail to find a suitable vector representation.
Besides, labeled datasets of domains are hard to obtain. In
future work, we will pursue solutions to these problems and
get a better detection model.
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